applicability to easily recognizable conduct, or as literal statements whose primary function was to add simplicity and certainty to antitrust law. As a result, antitrust analysis was deflected from a consideration of underlying substantive policies to a largely semantic effort to "characterize" conduct, and courts have had inordinate difficulty making and explaining decisions to apply per se rules.
The postulate that the Supreme Court appeared to embrace prior to Maricopa would restore the original conception of the scope and role of the per se rules-one that views the rules as a summation of substantive antitrust policy and hence to be applied only after analysis of policy considerations. Were this postulate fully accepted it would be significant. It would mean that decisions to apply a per se rule must be based on the substantive policies of the Sherman Act, rather than on linguistic compartmentalization, requiring courts to examine and explain the substantive policies, and thus enlivening antitrust analysis with new substantive vigor. A second postulate of the Chicago school writers-a reorientation of substantive antitrust policy around the consumer welfare model-was also endorsed by the pre-Maricopa Supreme Court.
The Court said that the only relevant question in evaluating a restraint of trade is whether the restraint promotes or suppresses competition.
7 By implication, "competition" is not to be viewed necessarily as a process of independence and rivalry, but as the outcome of a process. The "promote competition" standard is meant to focus on whether business activity promotes consumer welfare by increasing productive and allocative efficiency, and it is to be guided by economic analysis. 322 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [1982 efficiency; when the combination overcomes a problem of externalities such as the free-rider problem; and when a combination reduces transaction costs. These three circumstances define the range of cases not covered by a per se rule.
II. THE FIRST POSTULATE: THE ROLE OF PER SE RULES
Despite their many benefits, per se rules have been an inadequate component of antitrust analysis, because no coherent theory has existed for determining when the rules were to be applied. This significant deficiency reflects confusion about the role of per se rules and misunderstanding of the substantive antitrust policy that underlies the rules.
Per se rules, which are ~aid to be applicable to price fixing, division of markets, horizontal group boycotts, and tying agreements, encapsulate a conclusion that identified conduct is so inherently anticompetitive or so devoid of redeeming virtues that the conduct is unlawful in and of itself, without regard to the effect of the conduct or the purpose of those engaging in it. 9 Under per se rules, both anticompetitive purpose and anticompetitive effect are conclusively presumed to exist once the forbidden conduct is proven, so that proof of the forbidden conduct is by itself proof of an antitrust violation. In contrast, if a per se rule is not applied, the case must be tried under the rule of reason, which requires the plaintiff to prove the anticompetitive purpose or effect of the conduct and which permits the defendant to prove that the conduct achieves legitimate competitive goals. 10] SUPREME COURT ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 323 Because they simplify antitrust doctrine, per se rules often promote such important enforcement goals as ease of application, deterrence, and predictability. 11 The certainty provided by the rules, however, is often illusory. Although the per se rules tell a court that issues of purpose and effect are irrelevant to a case in which the rule is applied, no decision to apply a per se rule can be made until after analysis, however rudimentary, of whether the rule should be applied. In all but the easiest cases, the determination whether to apply the rule has been troublesome, largely because few coherent, consistent standards have existed for making that determination.
Although the per se rules are usually stated as if they were selfexecuting, they are not. 12 The per se rule covering tying arrangements, for example, is not applied until several issues of purpose and effect are determined. 13 The per se price-fixing rule is strong but not omnipotent: when independent firms agree to reduce competitign between themselves, without doing more, their conduct is doubtless unlawful, 14 but not all conduct that might literally or 11 E.g.; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) : "This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken." 12 A similar point is made in Bork, The Rule of Reason and the PerSe Concept: Price-Fixing a11d Market Divisio11, 74 YALEL.J. 775, 777 (1965) : "The current shibboleth of per se illegality in existing law conveys a sense of certainty, even of automaticity, which is delusive. The per se concept does not accurately describe the law relating to agreements eliminating competition as it is, as it has been, or as it ever can be. Alongside cases announcing a sweeping per se formulation of the law there has always existed a line of cases refusing to apply it. Doubtless some of the cases in the latter group were wrongly decided, but it would be naive to write them all off as simply incorrect or aberrational. The persistent refusal of courts to honor the literal terms of the per se rules against price-fixing and market-division agreements demonstrates a deep-seated though somewhat inarticulate sense that those rules, as usually stated, are inadequate." 13 The per se rule is applied only if the seller is selling two separate products, the tying product is unique or has market power, and a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product is foreclosed. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fort11er /);United S"tates Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (Fortner//) . Moreover, the per se rule.is not applied if the combined selling of two products is essential to the seller's goodwill. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960 ), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961 .
14 The price-fixing per se rule applies to agreements between unintegrated competitors concerning credit terms, Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) 15 Similarly, the per se rule applicable to horizontal group boycotts is so riddled with exceptions that it is difficult to restate the rule in a meaningful way.
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The per se rules became defective because they lost touch with the substantive policy that prompted their formulation. As a result, the characterization process-the process of determining whether the conduct challenged in a lawsuit should be characterized as, for example, price fixing subject to the per se rule-is often guided by analytical methods that bear no relationship to relevant substantive criteria. 17 300 (1919) , which permits some refusals to deal with price cutters, and by the doctrine that a seller may determine the prices at which his agents or legitimate consignees sell. Marty's Floor Covering Co., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 604 F. 2d 266 (4th Cir. 1979 to so torture the relevant doctrine as to make the application of antitrust law appear whimsical, 19 even when it would not be were it freed from the semantic grip of the per se rules. In short, without a theory for deteqpining when the per se rules are to be appliedthat -is, without attention to the substantive policy that underlies the rules-the rules became formless and opaque.
One of the most ignominious antitrust cases, United States v. Topco Associates Inc., 20 is illustrative. There, the Court applied the per se rule that prohibits division of territories between sellers of different brands (restraints on interbrand competition) 21 to an agreement in which grocery store members of a joint buying agency bound themselves to sell the agency's merchandise (a single brand) in assigned, closed territories (which restrains only intrabrand competition). Despite the district court's thorough rule of reason analysis upholding the restraint, 22 the Supreme Court eschewed any analysis, even analysis to determine whether the per se rule should be applied. The restraint was classified as a horizontal restraint and the Court refused to determine whether the restraint was different from those horizontal restraints subject to the per se rule. 23 The Court should not have applied the per se rule at all. Unlike horizontal interbrand restraints subject to the per se rule, these "horizontal" restraints were primarily intrabrand restraints and were ancillary to the integration of grocery stores in a joint 19 Lo"•er federal courts have been ingenious in creating formulas to blunt the force of literal per se rules. Some courts have established prerequisites for a per se rule. Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 , 1299 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979 ) ("per se rules have only been applied in the face of arguably demonstrable anticompetitiveness"); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978 ), cert. dmied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979 ; Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass 'n, 552 F.2d 646, 653 (5th Cir. 1977 ) (per se rule not applied in absence of "minimal indicia of anti-competitive purpose or effect"). Still other courts avoid the per se rules by recharacterizing the conduct, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging, 549 F.2d 368, 379 (5th Cir. 1977 ) ("We deal here not with tie-ins, whose adverse effects and lack of redeeming virtue are by now quite familiar, but instead with approved source requirements"). Other courts practice benign neglect of per se rules, e.g., Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980 Ct. 2466 Ct. , 2473 Ct. (1982 . 28 Although Topco members were free to expand into one another's territory if they did not use the profitable Topco brand, the Topco brand may have been so integrated into their operations that the members would not expand territories without it. If that were true, the territorial exclusivity for the Topco brand eliminated interbrand as well as intra brand competition, and that adverse competitive effect might have outweighed the procompetitive effect of the strong Topco brand. Although the findings of the district court undercut this theory (see finding 45, 319 F. Supp. at 1037), the government's brief plausibly challenged that finding. Brief for the United States 30-33.
29 According to Justice Marshall, "(w]hether or not we would decide this case the same way under the rule of reason used by the District Court is irrelevant," 405 U.S, at 609. This suggests that cases might be decided differently under the rule of reason than under per se rules, a nonsensical suggestion that one of the rules is irrational. Justice Burger expressed the better view in his dissent: "per se rules that have been developed are ... directed to the protection of the public welfare; they are complementary to, and in no way inconsistent with, the rule of reason." 405 U.S. 621. Justice Marshall also misperceived the relationship between the Court and Congress, "Should Congress," he said, "ultimately determine that predictability is unimportant in this area of the law, it can, of course, make per sc rules inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach." 405 U.S. 609-10 n.IO. When Congress passed the Sherman Act, however, it did not legislate predictability as a weightier value than fidelity, nor did it explicitly legislate any per se rules, much less the rule applied by the Topco majority.
Justice Blaclunun, who found the Topco result "anomalous" because it would "tend to stultify Topco members' competition with the great and larger chains," nonetheless concurred in the result on the mistaken theory that "(t]he per se rule ... now appears to be so firmly established by the Court that, at this late elate, I could not oppose it." 405 U.S. at 612-13. The per se rule, however, had never been firmly established as to territorial intrabrand restraints. Paradoxically, Justice Blaclunun later joined the majority in overturning the established per se rule applicable to vertical non price restraints. Continental TV., lnc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977) .
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Most significantly, the existence of a per se rule should not, and logjcally cannot, preclude a court from determining whether the peF se rule should be applied. The applicability of the per se rule is not an issue that is foreclosed by the existence of a per se rule. If the characteristics of a case are so different from previous per se cases that the substantive policy embodied in the per se rule is no longer applicable, the rule should not be applied. It makes little sense to invoke the per se rule, as Topco did, solely because analysis under the rule of reas~n is complicated. 30 Whether the per se rule is applicable is not complicated or beyond judicial capacities; that issue should rarely be decided on the basis of the difficulty of the analysis once the rule of reason is invoked. If the per se rule is inapplicable, it is because the conduct is possibly procompetitive, and, under most circumstances, any rational attempt to assess com-" petitive effects would be better than invoking a per se rule that, by ignoring procompetitive effects, will inevitably lead to incorrect results. Concededly, per se rules rest in part on a judgment that more extensive analysis would not produce a sufficiently more accurate assessment of competitive effects to outweigh the costs of the analysis, including both monetary costs and the cost of uncertainty.
31 A per se rule can therefore be applied whenever a court determines that alternate analysis is unduly costly. The existence of the per se rule, however, does not relieve the court from evaluating the costs and benefits of a more detailed analysis in the case before it. Moreover, although there are undoubtedly situations in which the alleged redeeming virtues of restraints of trade are incapable of being 30 As Chief Justice Burger said in his Topco dissent: "The issues presented by the antitrust cases reaching this Court are rarely simple to resolve under the rule of reason; they do indeed frequently require us to make difficult economic determinations. We should not for that reason alone, however, be overly zealous in formulating new per se rules, for an excess of zeal in that regard is both contrary to the policy of the Sherman Act and detrimental to the welfare of consumers generally." 405 U.S. at 624. 31 E.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J ., dissenting): "Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified on the assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh the losses and that significant administrative advantages will result. In other words, the potential competitive harm plus the administrative cost of determining in what particular situations the practice may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result. If the potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then they are simply not worth identifying in individual cases"). Similar views are expressed in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.l6 (1977) and KAYSE;\1 & Tt.:R;-.IER, A;\ITITRL: ST POLICY, 142-44 (1959) . 328 THE SUPREME COURi REVIEW [1982 identified and evaluated efficiently, 32 most forms of procompetitive collaboration can be identified and evaluated without undue cost.
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In those cases, a per se rule should not be applied until the appropriate analysis has been completed. The Court's pre-J11aricopa opinions began to reflect a per se rule that was attuned more to fidelity to antitrust values than to certainty and thus that was in touch with the substantive policy underlying the per se rules. When it reversed the per se rule applicable to nonprice vertical restraints, the Court referred to the "demanding standards" 34 for establishing a per se rule, and noted that although the per se rules provide procedural advantages, "those advantages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law ·would be reduced to per se rules, thus introducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law. "
35 Later, when it refused to apply the per se pricefixing rule to the joint licensing of copyright rights, the Court noted that the "easy labels [of per se rules] do not always supply ready ansvvers" 36 and spoke of the importance of examining the substantive policies underlying the rules: 37 As generally used in the antitrust field, "price fixing" is a shorthand \vay of describing certain categories of business behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable. The Court of Appeals' literal approach [in applying the per se rule] does not alone establish that this particular practice is one of those types or that it is "plainly anticompetitive and very likely without redeeming virtue." Literalness is overly simplistic and often overbroad. VVhen two partners set the price of their goods or services they are literally "price fixing," but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act .... Thus, it is necessary to characterize the challenged conduct as falling within or without the category of behavior to which we apply the label "per se price fixing." That will often, but not always, be a simple matter. 32 This may be true, for e;;ample, of the claim that price fixing between unintegrated competitors leads to lower capital costs by reducing uncertainty. Other examples of theoretically procompetitive price fixing are in SCHERER, l0iDL:STRlAL 0RGA011ZATI001 ECOc-iOMJCS 509 (1980), and Mason, 1Harket Power and Busi11ess Conduct: Some Commenls, -t6 A/11. ECON.
REV. 471-81 (1956) . 33 See text accompanying notes 62-115 infra. The Court applied a per se rule, however, and refused to allow the Society to prove its assertion. Because Justice Stevens's majority opinion repeatedly invoked the term "Rule of Reason," and because the rule of reason and per se rules are often thought to be separate analytical categories, some have believed that Professional Engineers was decided under traditional rule of reason analysis. 41 To Justice Stevens, however, the "Rule of Reason" contains the analysis necessary to decide whether to apply the per se rule and thus covers all antitrust cases. Justice Stevens's "Rule of Reason" is not a rule of reasonableness, but a rule having to do with reasonsY All 38 435 U. S. 679 (1978) . 39 The Court summarized the defense as follows: " [T] he Society averred that the standard set out in the Code of Ethics was reasonable because competition among professional engineers was contrary to the public interest. It was averred that it would be cheaper and easier for an engineer 'to design and specify inefficient and unnecessarily expensive structures and methods of construction.' Accordingly, competitive pressure to offer engineering services at the lowest possible price would adversely affect the quality of engineering. Moreover, the practice of awarding engineering contracts to the lowest bidder, regardless of quality, would be dangerous to the public health, safety and welfare. For these reasons, the Society claimed that its Code of Ethics was not an 'unreasonable restraint of interstate trade or commerce.' " 435 U.S. at 684-85 (footnotes omitted). 40 [1982 restraints must be supported by reasons (i.e., justifications) that are legally acceptable; the "Rule of Reason" determines which reasons are legally acceptable and which are not. In effect, the decision in Professional Engineers to disallow defendants' asserted reason for their restraint is a decision, under Justice Stevens's "Rule of Reason," to apply the per se rule, 43 one that is based on the substantive policy of the antitrust laws.
Under these pre-Maricopa cases, per se analysis functions as the keystone of antitrust analysis. A decision to apply a per se rule should be a decision that the conduct has no redeeming virtues, or at least none worth considering. Conversely, a decision not to apply a per se rule should reflect the substantive content of the rule. It should be based on a conclusion that the conducr in question has redeeming virtues that are worth trying to evaluate, and should thus identify the factors that are relevant in a more extended, factual analysis. These are substantive policy decisions and are not designed merely to simplify antitrust doctrine.
Ill. THE SECOND POSTULATE: THE CONSUiviER

\VELF/i,_RE l\10DEL
The Supreme Court's characterization of the per se rules as substantive, not procedural, rules is important. Even more important is that in its pre-A1aricopa cases the Court restored the original vision of policy-based per se rules by identifying the substantive policies that guide their application.
The Court invoked the familiar promote/suppress standard from Chicago Board ofTrade 44 as the unifying antitrust standard. 45 Under this standard, if a restraint arguably promotes competition, it is supported by reasons that require analysis of the net effect of the restraint. H, on the other hand, the only reason for the restraint is to suppress competition, it is supported by no acceptable reason and is therefore unlawful per se. 43 Justice Stevens's notion that per se cases are a category of cases under the Hule of Heason has not been repeated by the Court. Indeed, when Justice Stevens wrote the 1l1aricopa opinion, note 5 supra, he did not capitalize "rule of reason." It is nonetheless clear that a court must examine the reasons advanced to justify a restraint before deciding in which category to place it.
-H Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) . 45 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) .
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At one level the promote/suppress standard appears paradoxical. If "competition" means business rivalry, then all restraints of trade suppress competition and should be unlawful under the standard. For example, when the seller of a business agrees not to compete with the buyer of the business, competition is suppressed in the sense that the restraint eliminates the potential rivalry of the seller. Hence, if competition is equated with rivalry, a literal interpretation of Professional Engineers might "call into question the classic ancillary restraints" 46 or preclude a court from considering ethical or safety norms, even though the Supreme Court has said that those restraints are to be evaluated under the rule of reason.
47
The explanation for this apparent paradox is that the Court uses the consumer welfare model articulated by Professor Bork 48 to apply the promote/suppress standard. Under this model, competition is seen not as a process of rivalry but as a process that maximizes consumer welfare by maximizing both allocative and productive efficiency. Competition is thus promoted by increasing the efficiency of markets, even if a reduction in rivalry results. The promote/suppress standard thus permits rivalry to be restrained in order to maximize efficiency and consumer welfare.
Although the Burger Court has not explicitly endorsed the consumer welfare model, the promote/suppress standard and the Court's pre-Maricopa decisions are intelligible only if interpreted in the light of that model. Moreover, in those decisions the Court often used language suggestive of the consumer welfare model. For example, the Court cited Robert Bork's contention that the Sherman Act is a "consumer welfare prescription" 49 and noted that "an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would appear to lack any objective benchmarks. " 50 Moreover, said the Court, antitrust analysis is to focus "directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions" 51 to determine "whether the practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost 46 Robinson, Recmt Antitrust Developll;mts-1979, 80 COLIJM. L. REv. I, 17 (1980) . 47 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688, 696 (1978) . 48 BORK, THE fu"\ITITRUST PARADOX (1978) . 49 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979 53 As stated by Justice Stevens, antitrust analysis "does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable,"S+ so the purpose of antitrust
•.
• • a.na1ys1s lS not to oec10e wnetuer a poilcy lavonng compennon JS in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy decision has been made by Congress. " 55 Because competition is always in the public interest, antitrust analysis does not permit "inquiry into the reasonableness of the prices set by private agreement" or "argument that because of the special characteristics of a particular industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and commerce than competition. " 56 Accordingly, the Society's attempt in Professional Engineers to justify its restraint "on the basis of the potential threat that competition poses to the public safety and the ethics of its profession is nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act, " 57 providing no "reasons that I~ short, the per se rules wield their power because they express the substantive conclusion that restraints may not be justified by the argument that without the restraint the competitive process would be undesirable, destructive, or contrary to the public interest. Under the consumer welfare model, restraints that are unable to improve efficiency cannot be justified on any other basis.
Justice Stevens also clarified the Goldfarb footnote and the relevance of the Society's argument that the professional aspects of engineering require less stringent analytical standards than are normal. The Court denied that the "cautionary footnote" of Goldfarb could "be read as fashioning a broad exemption under In other words, special considerations relating to the professions might influence analysis under the rule of reason, but they do not affect analysis of whether to apply the rule of reason. Thus, when competitors "regulate and promote" competition by prohibiting unethical practices, the rule of reason requires a court to consider whether aspects of the professions are relevant to "the nature of competition" within the profession. In contrast, a decision to apply a per se rule depends only upon examining the reasons advanced to justify a restraint to see if they are "cognizable under the Sherman Act," 61 and that examination is the same for professions as for other Although the "suppress" side of the promote/suppress standard captures the central antitrust principle that consumer welfare is always in the public interest (unless Congress deems otherwise), the "promote" side of the standard is far more interesting and intricate, in part because defendants generally will have the burden of proving that their restrictive agreements promote competition. Analysis of the three ways that trade restraints promote competition shows that the promote competition standard is an economicsoriented theory aro~nd which an.titrust doctrine can be developed, predicted, and evaluated.
1. Integration to efficiency. The predominant form of procompetitive competitor collaboration-and the form that is easiest to recognize and evaluate-is integration to efficiency. The law protects worthwhile integration by permitting restraints that are necessary to facilitate savings of resources or improvements of quality. This strain of tl1e market efficiency theme is pervasive, evident not only in the law applicable to mergers 62 and joint ventures, 63 where it has long been recognized, but also in the la-w relating to tying arrangements,64 group boycotts, 65 and price fixing.
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Integration occurs when independent firms pool resources to achieve a task; integration results in efficiencies when it permits the firms to avoid costs or to improve quality; integration is worthwhile when firms could not otherwise achieve the efficiencies as quickly. When a restraint is ancillary to an integration that provides efficiencies not otherwise obtainable, a court must apply the rule of reason to determine whether the value of the market efficiency achieved by integration outweighs the adverse effect of the restraint.
Two recent Supreme Court cases nicely illustrate the difference between restraints that are ancillary to integration and those that are not.
Performing rights organizations like ASCAP and BMI were organized by composers to facilitate the enforcement of rights under the copyright laws. Both organizations hold nonexclusive licenses from copyright owners. They sublicense their rights to copyright users and distribute the proceeds to the copyright owners in accordance with a schedule that reflects, among other things, the frequency and nature of use of each copyrighted work. Both organizations refuse to sublicense individual works. They grant only blanket licenses that cover all works in which they have an interest. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 67 CBS challenged the blanket license policy. CBS did not claim that ASCAP and BMI agreed to any term of sale. CBS claimed instead that by establishing a price for its blanket license, each performing rights organization independently engaged in price fixing that is per se unlawful.
The Supreme Court refused to apply a per se rule, finding that "the challenged practice may have redeeming competitive virtues and that the search for those values is not almost sure to be in vain. " 68 More particularly, the blanket license "accompanies the integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use. " 69 The blanket license "is a necessary consequence of the integration necessary to achieve these efficiencies, 67 441 u.s. 1, 20 (1979 71 involved competitors coordinating, not integrating, their operations. The defendants, competing beer distributors, had agreed to stop selling on credit. Although the per se rule had long been thought to outlaw agreements betw~en independent firms covering any aspect of price, 72 including agreements covering credit terms, 73 both the district court 74 and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 75 refused to apply the per se rule. The Ninth Circuit characterized the credit agreement as a nonprice agreement, akin to product standardization, which "may actually enhance competition. "
76
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed this derogation of the per se rule. 77 Holding that credit is an aspect of price, so that a horizontal agreement on credit terms is subject to a literal application of the per se rule, rhe Court also held that prior cases "foreclose both of the possible justifications" 78 suggested by the Ninth Circuit. The argument that by reducing credit competition the defendants would induce new, procompetitive entry \vas said to be identical to ::Jro·ninQ that comoetitor.s shonld be Jllowed to
make entry attractive by agreeing to raise prices. The per se cases had rejected that argument. 79 Similarly, the argument that by reducing credit competition the defendants might increase price visibility and thus increase overall competition was unacceptable under the per se rule. "Any industrywide agreement on prices will result in a more accurate understanding of the terms offered by all parties 70 ld. at 21. On remand, the court of appeals found the blanket license policy to be lawful under the rule of reason. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Cotnposers, Authors and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980 to the agreement" 80 but, under the per se rules, no such agreement is permitted. As a result, the defendants' agreement to eliminate credit was unsupported by permissible reasons and was therefore unlawful per se.
The Court's reasoning is sound. Catalano involved no integration offunctions, only coordination of operations. Moreover, the defendants could not convincingly argue that their agreement integrated the market to make it operate more efficiendy. In short, no resource savings counterbalanced the loss of competition flowing from the restraint, and the restraint was therefore per se unlawful.
2. Externalities,Jree-riders, and optimal investment. The second way in which trade restraints may increase market efficiency is by overcoming misallocation of resources caused by externalities-the costs and benefits of economic activity that are not reflected in market prices.
81 Investment decisions made in the market will reflect consumer welfare as long as all social costs and benefits of the activity are included in market prices; all investments that consumers are willing to pay for, but only those investments, will be generated by the market. As a result, in a competitive system it is ordinarily presumed that market forces, not government or private restraints, should govern investment decisions.
The problem of externalities, however, may mean that investment decisions reached through market mechanisms are inappropriate. When the value of commercial activity can be appropriated by consumers (and competitors) without payment, underinvestment in that activity is likely because the rewards of investment are reduced. This is true, for example, for so-called public goods 82 - goods such as national defense that benefit even those who do not pay for them. Conversely, when economic activity imposes costs on the public or competitors that are not included in market prices, too much investment may take place. Under such circumstances, intervention in the market to overcome the resource misallocation caused by externalities may increase market efficiency and thus be procompetitive. iiHE SUPREME COURI REVIEW [1902 The problem of externalities is an important integrating concept in the la-vvs relating to the competitive system. It serves as a justification for environmental and ~afety regu1ation 83 and as the primary economic support for the prohibition on copying and imitation found in the law of copyrights, 84 patents, 85 and unfair competition. 86 In antitrust, the free-rider problem is the externality that has attracted the most attention.
87 It is thus significant that the Supreme Court accepted the free-rider argument as a legitimate justification for nonprice vertical restraints. 88 Non price vertical restraints may increase investment in services provided by dealers and distributors, and thus increase market efficiency, by assuring that consumers and competitors will not benefit from such investment without paying for it.
The problem of externalities, however, is not limited to vertical distribution restraints. For example, when Justice Stevens analyzed the venerable Mitchell v. ReyJlold.r 89 in Professional Engineers, 90 he showed that concern for the free-rider problem is a long-standing antitrust theme. Jvfiichel! v. Reynolds approved a noncornpetition agreement given by the seller of a business-a ci::~ssic restraint of trade imposed to overcome a free-rider problem. A perso:n \vho sells his business is a potential free-rider on the value of the goodwill transferred with the business, because his established business relationships and accumulated know-how permit him to appropriate inexpensively the customer goodwill and business opportunities he transferred to the new owner. The law therefore permits the seller to agree not to compete with the buyer of the business in 83 Breyer, Aualyziug Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Lcss Restricth; c Altemati"ues, aud Reform, 10] SUPREME COURT ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 339 order to overcome this free-rider possibility and protect the value of the business being transferred. Such a restriction, if reasonable, is upheld because "the long-run benefit of enhancing the marketability of the business itself-and thereby providing incentives to develop such an enterprise-outweighed the temporary and limited loss of competition. "
91
Free-rider problems also underlie permissive treatment in some price-fixing and boycott cases. 92 For example, restrictions on hiring by organized athletic teams may be-justified as necessary to avoid the possibility that one team will impose costs-in the form of decreased reputation 93 or safety 94 -on the other teams without having to compensate for those costs.
Identifying the problem of externalities as a justification for trade restraints shows the relationship between cases previously thought to be unrelated. The externalities problem is not, however, an acceptable justification in every antitrust context, 95 so care must be taken in its application. Courts should focus their analysis of particular cases on whether circumstances exist that give rise to a genuine problem of externalities; whether the investment induced or saved by the restraint is significant enough to ourvveigh the restrictive 91 435 U.S. at 688-89. 92 iHE SUPREME COUR7 REVIEW [1932 features of the restraint; and whether the externalities can be overcome by any less restrictive means.
C. REDUCING TRANSACTION COSTS
Collaborative conduct may also increase market efficiency by reducing transaction costs-the costs of matching buyers and sellers.
96 Unlike the model of pure competition, 97 in real markets information is not ubiquitous or costless. It is costly to search for goods and for information about goods, to bargain over terms of sale, and to enforce bargains. Uncertainty is pervasive, and measures to reduce uncertainty or control risks are costly. As a result, market output is increased when restraints reduce information or bargaining costs, overcome impediments to the flow of information and efficient bargaining, or reduce uncertainty. Several examples of procompetitive restraints that reduce transaction costs are illustrative.
1. Integration to reduce bmgaining costs. Transaction costs are reduced, of course, ·when integration of activities eliminates duplicate barg;~ining efforts and thus reduces the cost of bargaining, as in Broadcast 1Husic 98 and several cases upholding joint sales agencies.
99
The antitrust issues in such cases are similar to those in any cases of integration, namely, (l) whether the integration is reasonably necessary to achieve the efficiencies, and (2) whether restraints flowing from the integration are truly necessary to achieve the integration. When both questions are answered affirmatively, it may safely be concluded that the procompetitive effects of the integration outweigh any resulting loss of competition. 2. Otganization to reduce search costs. The amount and quality of information available about the market significantly affects search costs-the costs of knowing and evaluating the options the market 96 See generally WILLIAMS001, MARKETS A01D HIERARCHIES: A01ALYSIS A01D A01TITRGST · !MPLICATI001S 20-40 (1975) .
97 E.g., MA01SFIELD, MICROEC0010MICS 2H-35 (2d ed. 1975 100 Efficient amounts of appropriate information may not be generated by the market, however, without competitor collaboration or government intervention, because of the public goods characteristic of information, 101 and because persons will not want to divulge information without a promise that the recipients will reciprocate. As a result, in the absence of a restriction of output, numerous forms of restraint ancillary to information improvement are sanctioned by the antitrust laws-information exchanges among competitors, 102 organized trading exchanges, 103 and product testing and rating. 104 The problem of search costs and the explanation of the way in which quality, safety, and ethical norms may promote efficiency 105 explain why the Court in Professional Engineers said that "[e]thical norms may se'rve to regulate and promote ... competition" 106 and thus fall outside the per se rules. When it is costly for consumers to evaluate products, it is difficult for them to reward the products they like with higher prices; prices will reflect the average quality of all interchangeable products, both good and bad. As a result, the 100 See Benham, Tbe Effect of Advertising on tbe Price of Eyeglasses, IS J.L. & EcoN. 337, 338 product characteristics may facilitate product interconnection, as when the circuitry of audio components is standardized, or interchangeability, so that, for example, replacement parts can be purchased from any of a number of sellers. For these types of standardization, the risk of anticompetitive harm is small enough and the possibility of economic benefit great enough to support treatment under the rule of reason.
The Court's opinion in Catala11o, 110 in contrast, exposes the limits that have been placed on the product standardization argument. The Ninth Circuit's refusal to invalidate a horizontal agreement eliminating credit sales was based on its belief that the elimination of credit might be procompetitive, because it would channel rivalry away from nonprice competition and toward price competition by simplifying transactions and eliminating the "distraction" of nonprice terms. Although the Ninth Circuit's characterization of credit as a nonprice term is questionable, 111 the characterization issue is only a semantic quibble: the central issue is whether it is permissible for competitors to channel competition toward one form rather than another. . ever, does not legitimately reduce transaction costs. The defendants in Catala11o were not trying to give consumers more information about the market. Their argument was that consumers and the market process would benefit if there were less information about credit terms, because consumers would then focus on information (about prices) that would be more to their advantage. This is not an argument that increasing the amount of information leads to transactional efficiency, but that consumers should be protected from their own misuse of information generated by the market.
112 That argument is inconsistent with consumer welfare. When credit competition is flourishing it is presumably because consumers have chosen credit rivalry over price rivalry.
113 If the consumer sover-I !0 446 U. S. 643 (1980) . 111 See note 14 supra. 112 In applying the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has rejected a similar protectionist argument advanced to justify government restraints on commercial speech. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976}. 113 If there were a free-rider problem in the provision of information, one could not be so confident that consumers get the information they really want; but no free-rider problem is · apparent in Catalm1o. 10] SUPREME COURT ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 349 tent framework for analyzing antitrust issues. Prior to Maricopa, the Supreme Court appeared to be using that framework in its own analysis. The Court's performance in antitrust cases would improve if it continued to do so. Antitrust analysis would be improved substantially if the Court would interpret the promote/suppress standard using the consumer welfare model; that is, if it would examine restraints of trade to determine whether they improve productive or allocative efficiency. Under this approach, the per se rules would cease to be viewed as easily applied rules designed to simplify antitrust analysis. Rather, per se rules would be viewed as substantive rules, to be applied when analysis shows that conduct is unable to improve productive or allocative efficiency or that it is costly to determine the efficiency effects of conduct. This approach would not gut the per se rules. Collaboration between nonintegrated competitors that has no possibility of increasing productive or allocative efficiency can be recognized easily; conduct that is now properly subject to per se rules would continue to be subject to per se rules, and just as decisively.
At the same time, rational analysis of conduct that might increase emciency wou a De improvea. Kecogmzmg tuat me per se category is separated from the rule of reason category because of the potential for some conduct to promote efficiency, shows the unity of antitrust analysis and focuses attention on the substantive criteria that really matter in evaluating conduct. Moreover, adopting the consumer welfare model would require courts to consider more carefully the efficiency-producing properties of conduct and would thus enliven antitrust analysis with new substantive vigor.
